In my previous post here, we discussed about HL Global Enterprises' relatively complicated disposal of LKN Investment International Pte Ltd (LKNII) and some salient features about why the shares of the company were worth a bet. Looks like most (if not all) of the points covered went through nicely and things are indeed looking very well for them.
In Summary:
1. Disposal of LKNII and CHQ is completed and the >S$100M proceeds are already received.
2. Part of the proceeds are used to pay off the Venture Lewis loan in full.
3. HL Global Enterprises' future earnings will be relieved of the heavy interest expense as a result of payment of the loan and we should reasonably expect positive earnings going forward.
4. The free cash flows of the group remains positive as usual.
5. The group has applied for removal from the SGX-ST watchlist and they had undertaken to provide a reasonable exit offer for minority shareholders should SGX-ST somehow rejects the application (in my opinion, this scenario is unlikely).
6. A 3-cents dividend is declared, giving a yield of 6.4% on current price of 46.5-cents. This is the first dividend declared since probably >10 years ago.
7. The group is reviewing the proposed development of their Melaka property as well as sourcing for sustainable and viable businesses with the huge excess cash that remains even after the payment of the 3-cents dividend.
8. There are some changes to the Board.
HL Global Enterprises has essentially gone from net debt to net cash of about 60-cents per share. Book value also went from negative to about +84-cents per share (higher than my previous estimate of 75-cents per share). As mentioned previously, even after this disposal the group still have various profitable operations, investments and properties. At just 46.5-cents today and considering that much of the uncertainty related to the disposal removed, HL Global Enterprises is still significantly undervalued and definitely worth a bet.
Disclosure:
Long HL Global Enterprises (AVX.SI) since Jul '17
Showing posts with label investing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label investing. Show all posts
Monday, 26 February 2018
Wednesday, 22 November 2017
HL Global Enterprises (AVX.SI) - Potential exit from SGX-ST Watchlist
A few interesting facts from the completion of the complex disposal of HL Global Enterprises' (AVX.SI) share capital of LKN Investment International Pte Ltd (LKNII), which consists of 100% interest in Hutai that owns the 106-unit serviced apartment building Elite Residences located near Shanghai's central district as well as the 60% interest in loss-making CHQ that consists of the 455-unit Copthorne Hotel in Qingdao, located near Qingdao's central business district. More information can be gleaned here:
1. The company will receive net proceeds in excess of S$100M from both deals, the bulk of it already received.
2. HL Global will become a net cash company VS a net debt company before the disposal.
3. HL Global should report positive book value VS a negative book value previously.
4. The now positive book value should also be very much more than the current market cap (I estimate it to be around S$72M or S$0.75/share vs market cap of about S$44M or S$0.455/share).
5. The company will report a significant gain in earnings this year due to this disposal.
6. Main investments and properties of the group after completion still consists of:
a. 100% interest in Augustland Hotel Sdn Bhd which owns and operates the profitable Copthorne Hotel Cameron Highlands;
b. 49% interest in a management services company to Equatorial Hotel Shanghai;
c.100% interest in Victory Heights which owns a land located in Tengah Malaysia and finally;
d. 2 other pieces of land of approximately 8,400 sqm in Cameron Highlands, Malaysia.
As guided by management in earlier reports, I believe HL Global will use part of the huge cash proceeds for the repayment of the unsecured loan which has been one of the main causes of its losses the past few years via interest expense. Coupled with loss-making CHQ already out of the picture, HL Global should be able to report reasonable earnings going forward, fulfill the financial exit criteria and be removed from the SGX-ST Watchlist that is probably causing disinterest in the shares of this company. The company has also been reporting positive free cash flows.
Lastly, the substantial cash that remains even after paying the unsecured loan in full may be used to fund suitable acquisitions of new businesses and possibly, the payment of a dividend.
Management has been trying various ways to get HL Global out of the SGX-ST watchlist for some time now and I think this is one of the more favorable (if not most favorable) outcomes that potentially will lead to the exit of SGX watchlist.
Disclosure:
Long HL Global Enterprises (AVX.SI) since Jul '17
![]() |
| Elite Residences in Shanghai, the PRC |
2. HL Global will become a net cash company VS a net debt company before the disposal.
3. HL Global should report positive book value VS a negative book value previously.
4. The now positive book value should also be very much more than the current market cap (I estimate it to be around S$72M or S$0.75/share vs market cap of about S$44M or S$0.455/share).
5. The company will report a significant gain in earnings this year due to this disposal.
6. Main investments and properties of the group after completion still consists of:
a. 100% interest in Augustland Hotel Sdn Bhd which owns and operates the profitable Copthorne Hotel Cameron Highlands;
b. 49% interest in a management services company to Equatorial Hotel Shanghai;
c.100% interest in Victory Heights which owns a land located in Tengah Malaysia and finally;
d. 2 other pieces of land of approximately 8,400 sqm in Cameron Highlands, Malaysia.
As guided by management in earlier reports, I believe HL Global will use part of the huge cash proceeds for the repayment of the unsecured loan which has been one of the main causes of its losses the past few years via interest expense. Coupled with loss-making CHQ already out of the picture, HL Global should be able to report reasonable earnings going forward, fulfill the financial exit criteria and be removed from the SGX-ST Watchlist that is probably causing disinterest in the shares of this company. The company has also been reporting positive free cash flows.
Lastly, the substantial cash that remains even after paying the unsecured loan in full may be used to fund suitable acquisitions of new businesses and possibly, the payment of a dividend.
Management has been trying various ways to get HL Global out of the SGX-ST watchlist for some time now and I think this is one of the more favorable (if not most favorable) outcomes that potentially will lead to the exit of SGX watchlist.
Disclosure:
Long HL Global Enterprises (AVX.SI) since Jul '17
Thursday, 21 July 2016
SMRT Corporation Buyout Offer: An Alternative Viewpoint
Temasek is buying out the 'troubled' transport firm SMRT at S$1.68 - valuing the company at about S$2.56B. Because Temasek owns 54.1%, they have to pay about S$1.18B for the remaining stake.
Readers of my blog would have known I bought SMRT back in 2014 at an average cost of about $1.02 and sold the same year at $1.49. I left a comment and highlighted that the non-fare segment of the company seemed attractive as follows:

As can be seen, all 3 segments have shown marked and consistent increase in both the topline and operating results (total in 2016: S$123M) over the past 6 years. The total operating profit for the Rail & Non-Rail Segments is S$142.6M. That means the 3 biggest Non-Rail segment is >85% of the total Non-Rail and Rail operating results. I think it is not unreasonable to expect that the Non-Rail segments will do quite well in the foreseeable future. These 3 very profitable, inherently stable and growing segments combined could probably be worth about S$1.7B (this is only a quick and dirty estimate of 13X - 15X operating profit). Also take note that there are other Non-Rail segments that may be of some value as well (classified as Engineering Services, Other Services and Investment Holding and Support Services).
I'm not so sure why the focus out there concerns so much about the Rail segment and why the management has not expressed any thoughts on the striving Non-Rail segment with regards to the buyout offer. But from the standpoint of the investor and those who are supposed have a duty to look after shareholders' interest, it is unwise to focus solely on the Rail segment and keep harping about the Rail's corresponding risk.
There seems to be much confusion whether SMRT Rails should be more concerned with the investors' interest or the public's. Also, Chief Executive Desmond Kuek (former army general) said that "significant risks remain and many factors are outside the control of SMRT such as uncertainty over future fare increases and ridership numbers." I'm not so sure how 'significant' the risk for the rail segment is in the future despite being relieved of their heavy operating assets under the new Rail Financing Framework. I would hazard a guess that both fare and ridership numbers will at least remain stable and it is likely that operations will be less risky compared to before the implementation of the framework.
Disclosure:
No position in SMRT (S53.SI) as of 21 July 2016
Readers of my blog would have known I bought SMRT back in 2014 at an average cost of about $1.02 and sold the same year at $1.49. I left a comment and highlighted that the non-fare segment of the company seemed attractive as follows:
Comment: Quite lucky here as a
short while from my initial purchase, the price spiked up due to government's
announcement about the new model. Nevertheless, the price at S$1.02 was clearly
undervalued. The non-fare segment of the company was rather attractive
too. Considering the nature and moat of the business, I probably run the risk
that I've sold too low at S$1.49. Price now is S$1.58.
Some SMRT Non-Rail Results
Let's have a look at the results of 3 of the largest Non-Rail segments, namely: the Taxi, Rental and Advertising Segment -

As can be seen, all 3 segments have shown marked and consistent increase in both the topline and operating results (total in 2016: S$123M) over the past 6 years. The total operating profit for the Rail & Non-Rail Segments is S$142.6M. That means the 3 biggest Non-Rail segment is >85% of the total Non-Rail and Rail operating results. I think it is not unreasonable to expect that the Non-Rail segments will do quite well in the foreseeable future. These 3 very profitable, inherently stable and growing segments combined could probably be worth about S$1.7B (this is only a quick and dirty estimate of 13X - 15X operating profit). Also take note that there are other Non-Rail segments that may be of some value as well (classified as Engineering Services, Other Services and Investment Holding and Support Services).
I'm not so sure why the focus out there concerns so much about the Rail segment and why the management has not expressed any thoughts on the striving Non-Rail segment with regards to the buyout offer. But from the standpoint of the investor and those who are supposed have a duty to look after shareholders' interest, it is unwise to focus solely on the Rail segment and keep harping about the Rail's corresponding risk.
There seems to be much confusion whether SMRT Rails should be more concerned with the investors' interest or the public's. Also, Chief Executive Desmond Kuek (former army general) said that "significant risks remain and many factors are outside the control of SMRT such as uncertainty over future fare increases and ridership numbers." I'm not so sure how 'significant' the risk for the rail segment is in the future despite being relieved of their heavy operating assets under the new Rail Financing Framework. I would hazard a guess that both fare and ridership numbers will at least remain stable and it is likely that operations will be less risky compared to before the implementation of the framework.
Proposed Solution
- Since the focus of the buyout seemed to be on the Rail segment: spin out the Non-Rail segments so that their proper value can be realized by the market. Existing shareholders should be more than happy to then sell off the operations of the Rail and Bus segments not owned by Temasek for a lesser, say S$500M (this values the Rail & Bus segments to be about S$1.1B. Assuming the above valuation of $1.7B for the 3 Non-Rail segments are correct, SMRT could potentially be worth in excess of S$2.8B which corresponds to a price of about S$1.84 per share).
- Offer a (higher) price that truly reflects the value of both the Rail & Non-Rail segments. (I read in the news that in the past 10 odd years, SMRT's price averaged about S$1.64. Offered price is S$1.68. Obviously some shareholders might be unhappy with the current offer).
Advantages are Two-Fold:
- Rail and Bus assets out of the way and privatized - the role of a public transport operator can be better fulfilled in the long term without taking the pressure of short-term market expectations.
- With the Rail segment out, the market can more easily discern the true value of the remaining Non-Rail entities. Not only can shareholders receive some cash from the disposal, they would probably be very pleased to have their hands on a growing and very profitable Non-Rail segment.
Some Things to Work Out
Now, the Advertising and Rental businesses are obviously highly intertwined with the Rail business. Therefore, the question to ask is if the above solution is possible at all? I'll leave these to the shareholders and management to answer for themselves. It's tough, but a fair and equitable solution should be created for all parties involved.
Disclosure:
No position in SMRT (S53.SI) as of 21 July 2016
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Thursday, 7 January 2016
What a Start to the Stock Market in 2016!
Portfolio Results for 2015
I think readers of this blog would probably have guessed
that I did OK in 2015. AP Oil
gained >46%, Avi-Tech gained >38% but Sembcorp Industries crashed a hefty -34% (all returns before dividends) since my write-up
in this blog. What a crazy ride in 2015: On a portfolio basis and taking into
account dividends received, my Singapore portfolio went as high as +18.7%
(August) but ended off the year with a +12.8% gain while my Hong Kong portfolio went
from +48.5% (May) and ended 2015 with +25.7%. ![]() |
| Will 2016 be a good year for stock markets? |
Despite a 15% decline in 2015, our STI index continues to
register losses in the first few days of 2016. From its peak of about 3550, the
index had sunk about 23%. Will 2016 be a down year again? Honestly, your guess is as
good as mine.
Opportunities Abound
For me, rather than trying to predict at the macro level, I
feel it is more fruitful to focus on valuations of individual companies.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the market, make no mistake about it: there are more opportunities to take
advantage of than it was just a few months back. Uncertainty is the friend
of the buyer of long term values. Always be extra cautious in your dealings with the Mr Market but never be afraid of taking strategic advantage over him.
What I am going to do in 2016?
The wider
the fluctuations of the market, and the longer they persist in one direction,
the more difficult it is to preserve the investment viewpoint in dealing with
common stocks. I think it is of utmost importance for an investor to
have a logical process for investment and have the mental & emotional
fortitude to stick to it despite daily market gyrations & noises. Different
investors have different philosophies and the following is what I found quite useful (at least for me) thus far:
- Try to get a general sense how the business operate
- Ask yourself honestly if you can reasonably see the company still in existence and operating well >10 years later
- Limit your risk - ensure the company is in sound financial condition
- Limit your risk yet again - make sure the price you pay is significantly below your estimate of the business' value
- Diversify your risk adequately
- Have patience and conviction for value to be realized - the market for short term returns is very competitive but the market for longer term returns is much less competitive
These pointers are quite similar to my post on Our Investment Philosophy and I intend to adhere to it in 2016 and beyond.
Final Note
I’ve been slowly accumulating a few SG and HK stocks in the
past few months and one of them appears to be a rare find – having
reasonable defensive characteristics with potential for growth and selling at
extremely attractive prices. I intend to concentrate more on that particular
stock, probably towards 15-20% of my portfolio. If I have the time, I’ll
probably discuss more about them.
A few friendly readers actually emailed and asked if I’ve stopped
writing. I very much like to continue but will likely do so with shorter posts
and at a very leisurely pace. Meanwhile, I’ll be more than happy to discuss
investment related questions via the comments section of this blog or email at
secretinvestors@gmail.com. Happy stockpicking!
Monday, 12 October 2015
The Question of Dividends as Passive Income
Recently, a friend directed me
to Giraffe Value’s blog post titled “Investing For Dividend Income(Passive) is a Fairytale!!!” The angle about dividends (that they cannot be considered passive income) brought forward by GV is refreshing indeed but I believe GV has
missed out some salient points and thus decided to offer an alternative
perspective in this topic by commenting in his blog. With GV's knowledge,
I herewith copy my comments (with very minor edits to make things more easily
understood) below. It may be helpful if you first read GV's article to understand his take on dividends.
![]() |
| With the CD & XD effect, are Dividends paid out still considered Passive Income to the investor? |
Readers of this blog would have realized my reply are drawn out of and adheres closely to the "Business Perspective" section in my Stocks Investment Philosophy in which my investment framework is based on.
Also, as shown in my reply, I did agree with some points underscored
by GV. My intention here is to bring about healthy discussions in the hope of getting more clarity in this subject matter through insights and thoughts provided by readers and investors.
------------
Hi GV,
Good effort on your post. However, I wish to highlight an
alternative viewpoint that I personally feel provides a more inclusive and comprehensive
take about dividends. I believe the point of contention here is whether
dividends paid out is considered ‘passive income.’
First and foremost, I assume that your 2 questions are valid
in identifying whether passive income is involved. I would also add-on a 3rd
point to make the argument more robust:
1. Are you
richer after getting that dividend?
2. Would your
capital not get compromised after you receive the dividend?
3. Is the
money received passive (as opposed to the word ‘active’).
As a fundamental investor (I think you are one as well),
perhaps it is more insightful to look at holding the stock as being part-owners of the
business. To avoid complication, let’s just assume that we have 100% ownership
of a business. This view point can be easily extended to one who have partial
ownership of the business through buying its shares in the market.
As 100% owners of a profitable business, we employ officers
to add value to goods and services produced so as to generate income for us.
Every dollar earned from the business wholly belongs to the owners. In the
general sense, if earnings are $10M and beginning of year assets is $100M, the
company is now worth $110M. Going back to the 3 questions above, It is clear
that with full ownership of the business and by way of earnings generated, the
owners are now 1) $10M richer and obviously 2) their capital is not
compromised. Also, as the officers are the ones doing the hard work, we can
conclude that 3) it is ‘passive’ in nature. With this, we can say the earnings
are passive income to the owners.
The owners have the option to either keep the money in the
business as retained earnings or issue the earnings out as dividends. If say,
$5M of the earnings are released as dividends, the company is now worth $105M.
But because the owners own the business, their net worth is still $110M ($5M
dividends received plus $105M worth of business assets wholly owned by owners)
which necessarily means that in totality, their net worth still increased by
$10M. Is this $10M still considered passive? I argue so based on the 3
questions asked above. To the owners, these dividends are in actual fact just a
proxy to get hold of the passive earnings of the company.
Your take regarding the HDB is almost exactly the same as
the above scenario where it fulfils the 3 questions asked. Because in the stock
market, we are partial owners of the company, we tend to consider only the
dividends ($5M) and neglected the fact that the remaining $5M of the earnings
fully belonged to all shareholders as well (I believe your argument missed this
point too). So this $10M of earnings is akin to the rental income we get from a
fully owned HDB property.
Now let’s think from the standpoint of the stock investor.
Here, I would agree with you that an investor should consider both capital
appreciation and dividend return but I just want to highlight that dividends in
the investor's perspective are still passive income. Investor A purchase a
stock a $1 and price appreciates to $2. The company subsequently declares a
$0.50 dividends and share price proceeds to drop to $1.50 due to the XD effect.
Investor B purchases a stock at $1 and price appreciates to $2 with no
dividends declared. Both investors had a net gain of $1 from their investments.
Considering both realized and unrealized gain, it is clear that they are all
passive income to both investors. Having no net gain between Investor A and B
does not mean there are no passive income involved.
I also agree that your left pocket right pocket - zero sum
game theory makes perfect sense (but this does not mean dividends are not
passive income). Because dividends are
usually paid in liquid cash out of the company, it makes sense that stock price
should drop by the amount of dividends released. If not, we will find that the
net worth of the investor (which includes both dividends received as well as
ownership of the business) increase inexplicably. However, this effect is just
a logical stock market event to ensure that - assuming other things remaining
constant - the total amount of what owners received and what the business have
are the same before and after the event.
To conclude, CD-XD phenomenon is just an Event which fails
to explain that dividends received are not passive income but it does not
necessarily mean that dividends are not passive income. Viewed in the proper
way, the owner’s earnings are passive income and since dividends usually comes
from owner’s earnings, they are part of the passive income in every sense of
the word.
I got to your post because a friend referred it to me. Your
post must have generated strong interest as I understand that there are some
follow-ups in other financial blogs which mostly agree with your point that dividends
are not passive income. However, I feel that if we viewed this issue as a
whole, the logical (as well as intuitive) explanation contradicts the point
that dividends cannot be considered passive income. We've communicated some
time back and I know you are, like me, a keen learner of stock investments.
Hope to hear more about investments from you.
Secretinvestors
------------
PS: I appreciate that readers share their views about this in the comments section below. Also, GV gave an interesting reply to this comment. Readers can
refer to his blog article for that and decide for themselves which view point is more valid and logical.
Related Articles:
Our Stocks Investment Philosophy
Related Articles:
Our Stocks Investment Philosophy
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Friday, 13 February 2015
Avi-Tech Electronics Update - 30% Unrealized Gain in 2-3 Months & Half-year Earnings Report
In my analysis on Avi Tech Electronics (See Avi-Tech Electronics - Is Quick Profit Possible?), I highlighted the reasons both quantitatively and qualitatively, why I feel the company is undervalued and that the various ongoing corporate actions may serve as a catalyst to drive up the price towards its true value. Since my initial post about it on 30 December, the price has risen from S$0.074 to S$0.091 - a reasonable gain of >22% in about one and a half months. My own average price of S$0.699 would mean a 30% gain since around 2-3 months back at November. With the release of the half-yearly results yesterday, this post is just an update about how the story unfolds so far and my intended actions.
Much Improved Continuing Operations - Industry or Management Actions?
As seen clearly from the Table 1 above, revenue, gross profit and net income show marked improvements. Similar growth may be observed in its operating cash flows (you can find out more from the company's latest earnings release).
I've extracted Table 2 from my previous post on Avi Tech. Here, you'll notice that the company has been loss making for many years. Also, despite cleaning up the effects of the subsidaries (they are contributing the bulk of losses for the past few years) that are in the midst of being discontinued, the core operations still show slight negative results from 2012 to 2014. Since 1Q2015, it is clear that not only did the disposal of subsidiaries help stem further losses, the improvements in core business have contributed to profitability as well. All in all, the results in 1H2015 represents a significant turnaround transition from loss-making to profitability.
I believe it is important to pinpoint whether the improvements in core operations are the result of improvement in trends of the industry or due to specific actions undertaken by the management. From the announcement, the management mentioned that the semi-conductor industry as a whole appears to be in an uptrend recovery and they 'remain optimistic of continued improving performance if this uptrend continues'. With improved results seen across all business segments, it is pretty clear that the industry recovery did play a large part in the increase in revenue for the past few quarters.
However, I argue that the management played a significant role in retaining these revenues especially since the company's inclusion into the SGX watchlist in 4Q14. The gross profit margin has grown from 11.3% in 4Q14 to 22.6% in 2Q15 and this is, to quote the management, 'partly the result of effectiveness of the ongoing cost control measures and the enhancement in productivity across all business segments'. This is made clearer if we observe the drop of COGS as a percentage of revenue from 88.7% in 4Q14 to 77.4% in 2Q15. Another factor that plays a part is the significant decline of its operating expenses as a percentage of revenue from 18.9% to 9.9%. Although we do not have much information about the specifics of operating expenses, in the typical case such expenses should not provide future economic benefits to the company and thus such cost-cutting measures usually will not have serious undesirable consequences.
To sum it all up, an investor of the company should be heartened to see that the better set of results are not solely due to general improvements in the semi-conductor industry but also due to active steps taken by the management to ensure that more money flows into the bottom line.
Another reasonable way of checking the valuation would be the use of pro-forma statements as shown above. The main assumption here is that management is able to continue to keep Cost of Sales and Operating Expenses at 79.9% and 10.7% of revenue, as per 1H15 results. Finance costs and Operating income have been pretty stable over the years and should not venture too far away from $0.100M and $1M respectively.
From Scenario 1, if we were to assume that revenue reverts back to its worst level seen so far in 2014 (for eg, if semi-conductor industry as a whole declines and affect sales badly), the implied P/E ratio at current price of S$0.091 is 12.7x. Do note that 2014 net earnings is negative. This difference is mainly due to management's cost cutting and productivity measures that I had highlighted above - which further shows the importance of such management actions. If we were to annualize the 1H15 results such that the revenue will at least maintain current levels (as in Scenario 2), the implied P/E becomes 11.0x. These valuations ain't that demanding at all. Of course, the P/E based on my purchase price would have been much lower at 9.8x and 8.4x respectively. (I did not include Scenario 3, which is for those who feel the improvement in the industry as a whole will contribute further to sales growth. If this does happen, valuations will obviously be more attractive.)
![]() |
| Table 1: Avi Tech Electronics 1H15 Financial Summary (Continuing Operations) |
![]() |
| Table 2: Avi-Tech Results Including & Excluding Disposal Group |
![]() |
| Table 3: Avi Tech Quarter-Quarter & Half Year Results (Continuing Operations) |
However, I argue that the management played a significant role in retaining these revenues especially since the company's inclusion into the SGX watchlist in 4Q14. The gross profit margin has grown from 11.3% in 4Q14 to 22.6% in 2Q15 and this is, to quote the management, 'partly the result of effectiveness of the ongoing cost control measures and the enhancement in productivity across all business segments'. This is made clearer if we observe the drop of COGS as a percentage of revenue from 88.7% in 4Q14 to 77.4% in 2Q15. Another factor that plays a part is the significant decline of its operating expenses as a percentage of revenue from 18.9% to 9.9%. Although we do not have much information about the specifics of operating expenses, in the typical case such expenses should not provide future economic benefits to the company and thus such cost-cutting measures usually will not have serious undesirable consequences.
To sum it all up, an investor of the company should be heartened to see that the better set of results are not solely due to general improvements in the semi-conductor industry but also due to active steps taken by the management to ensure that more money flows into the bottom line.
Bonus: Cash from Discontinued Operations
I just want to highlight the fact that the discontinued operations did contribute a decent amount to the bottom line in the past 2 quarters. Although non-recurring in nature, its always good to know that its disposal will continue to throw in some amounts of cash for the company. The net asset value of this group under disposal currently stands at about $966,000.Interim Dividends - 1st Time Since 2011
Another positive note is the resumption of dividend payments after a hiatus of more than 3 years. Coupled with the purchase of shares by directors in the past 6 months, the interim dividends declared is a clear show of confidence from management that they believe that the company has indeed turned around. The interim dividends of $0.3 cents per share represents about 3.3% dividend yield at current market prices (4.3% based on my own purchase price).Valuation
In my previous article about Avi-Tech, I estimated that the liquidation value to be about S$0.094 per share. Using the same method alluded in that post, the new liquidation value should be S$0.099. I continue to believe that this is the minimum valuation that should be afforded to the company, especially considering that the continued improvement of business operations should provide further support to its intrinsic worth. This new valuation excludes the proceeds that Avi-Tech could have received in the future from the disposal of its subsidiaries.![]() |
| Table 4: Avi Tech Electronics Pro-Forma Financial Results |
From Scenario 1, if we were to assume that revenue reverts back to its worst level seen so far in 2014 (for eg, if semi-conductor industry as a whole declines and affect sales badly), the implied P/E ratio at current price of S$0.091 is 12.7x. Do note that 2014 net earnings is negative. This difference is mainly due to management's cost cutting and productivity measures that I had highlighted above - which further shows the importance of such management actions. If we were to annualize the 1H15 results such that the revenue will at least maintain current levels (as in Scenario 2), the implied P/E becomes 11.0x. These valuations ain't that demanding at all. Of course, the P/E based on my purchase price would have been much lower at 9.8x and 8.4x respectively. (I did not include Scenario 3, which is for those who feel the improvement in the industry as a whole will contribute further to sales growth. If this does happen, valuations will obviously be more attractive.)
Conclusion
It seems that Avi-Tech Electronics has finally turned around. Although we can't be sure if these very much improved results can be sustained, we can take comfort that:- The discontinued subsidiaries will not contribute any more losses to the company.
- Share purchase from directors in the past months and the resumption of dividends after >3 years indicate management's confidence about the prospects of the company.
- Management seems to be actively taking targeted measures to ensure profitability since the company was placed in the SGX Watchlist.
- The current market price of the company is not too excessive, both on a liquidation and earnings basis.
Having said all these and with the new estimated minimum liquidation value of $0.099 as a guide, I'll probably continue to hold on to my shareholdings until price exceeds above this or if there's any serious deterioration of fundamentals in the company that warrants my attention. Did any of you bought into Avi-Tech? Let me know your opinions!
Related Articles:
Avi Tech Electronics (CT1.SI) - Is Quick Profit Possible?
My SG Porfolio (Top Realized Gains & Losses) and Some Recent Picks
Disclosure:
Long Avi-Tech Electronics (CT1.SI)
Related Articles:
Avi Tech Electronics (CT1.SI) - Is Quick Profit Possible?
My SG Porfolio (Top Realized Gains & Losses) and Some Recent Picks
Disclosure:
Long Avi-Tech Electronics (CT1.SI)
Sunday, 1 February 2015
Q&A: Insights Gained from Interesting Comments
I mentioned previously in the post on Our Stock Investment Philosophy that one of the reasons for writing in this blog is to subject our investment thoughts to scrutiny and feedback so as to gain new insights in our investment journey. In the past 2 months, there are multiple comments from fellow bloggers and readers about my writings that I feel adds so much value to this blog. I couldn't ask for more. I'll like to take this opportunity to thank readers for their insightful comments and also republish some of these for the benefit of those who had have missed these comments despite reading the article.
I've tried my best to be selective and also to summarize these questions and answers so that readers can get the gist of it. Also, to save time, I've organized in such a way that you can go to the relevant heading and/or question that interests you. Of course, there are more comments which are very insightful and definitely worth a look if you have time. If you want more details, you can click on the headings to go to the relevant article (the comments section is below these articles, scroll down all the way if you want to read only those).
Unfortunately the rate of return probably is one of the least predictable of the 3 factors since there's no way we can be sure we can achieve 10% or 15% return over the long haul. Because of this unpredictability, I thought it is not so useful to state which factor is the most important in the practical sense. However, very fortunately for us, the time period is quite within our control and easily ‘applied’ if and only if we are young enough to start. Then again, achieving a 2-3% return over the long haul is probably easier than say, compounding it for 50 years due to the limitations of being a human. A balanced effort in working on all factors should be the better way to handle the compound equation.
All the 3 factors are highly intertwined and complementary to one another. For example, compounding $100K at 15% for 18, 19 and 20 years will give $1.24M, $1.42M ($180K more from 18th year), $1.64M ($220K more from 19th year) respectively. A good compound rate is important but the effect will be more pronounced if the length of time is extended due to the exponential effect of the formula. Similar relation applies for the other factors.
In conclusion, due to the varying ease of application and unpredictable nature of some factors, it is quite hard to conclude decisively which factor will do most for us in our lifetime. Consequently, I believe the best way to reconcile this is to focus on all 3 factors based on my proposed method to tackle each factor in my post (under The Real Trick – Combining all 3 Inputs).
Good post again to show the different scenarios amongst the 4. It's interesting though that you actually used the book value as a measurement of growth. I thought book value growth is much harder to achieve than earnings growth as it covers a wider spectrum. It is like earnings is the subset of that.
I've tried my best to be selective and also to summarize these questions and answers so that readers can get the gist of it. Also, to save time, I've organized in such a way that you can go to the relevant heading and/or question that interests you. Of course, there are more comments which are very insightful and definitely worth a look if you have time. If you want more details, you can click on the headings to go to the relevant article (the comments section is below these articles, scroll down all the way if you want to read only those).
Sembcorp Industries - Is It Worth the Buy Now?
The one thing analysts and all
investors (and myself) have been saying is the low PER their utilities segment
is currently valued in. We think it's cheap if we compare it against fellow
peers. But the question is, it has been for many years they are trading under
PER of 10x, so I'm not quite sure what would propel the shares to be trading at
15x. We may be too optimistic in that sense. We may be wrong of course but the
market has proven us wrong again and again. Will we see a day where it is
trading at PER of 15x? Maybe yes one day, and we can only hope.
Reply: I suspect that many investors
or potential ones are still deeply fixated about Sembcorp’s Marine business and
has not been aware of the success and growth of the utilities business, thereby
undervaluing it. Like you, I’m also not sure what would propel the shares of
the Utilities segment to 15x. But assuming we are not comparing with its peer
businesses or the market's valuation, and only basing strictly on a discounted
cash flow perspective, I think this valuation is fair considering the economic
characteristics of Utilities segment (leading position, stability and
predictability of cash flows etc). Basically on a zero-growth basis we are
putting a discount rate of 6.7% for a respectable business.
Also, my hunch is that my valuation for the Marine segment is probably a tad too low (Earnings power of S285M vs TTM earnings of S$345M plus PER of 12-13X) and I have considered the Urban Development business to be worth zero which is definitely not true.
Lastly, some final considerations which I did not include in the post is that – the Marine segment is probably the one providing the cash for Utilities expansion traditionally. If Marine is unable to do well under current circumstances, the Utilities might be affected. Sembcorp claims that the small Urban Development business may be a springboard for further involvement in opportunities for Utilities side but so far I haven’t really seen any synergies in this aspect (anyone, please correct me if I’m wrong). I guess these business relations wasn’t completely factored into my analysis. The valuation might be higher or lower because of these but I must really thank the margin of safety for providing some comfort here.
Also, my hunch is that my valuation for the Marine segment is probably a tad too low (Earnings power of S285M vs TTM earnings of S$345M plus PER of 12-13X) and I have considered the Urban Development business to be worth zero which is definitely not true.
Lastly, some final considerations which I did not include in the post is that – the Marine segment is probably the one providing the cash for Utilities expansion traditionally. If Marine is unable to do well under current circumstances, the Utilities might be affected. Sembcorp claims that the small Urban Development business may be a springboard for further involvement in opportunities for Utilities side but so far I haven’t really seen any synergies in this aspect (anyone, please correct me if I’m wrong). I guess these business relations wasn’t completely factored into my analysis. The valuation might be higher or lower because of these but I must really thank the margin of safety for providing some comfort here.
As an investor of SCI too, I feel pretty
confident. Yet, looking at the price curve, I noted that in Oct 2011, there is
a dip of prices below 3.5? And that was already way beyond post crisis low
period below 2.5. I had
not followed SCI then and was curious why did that happen? Just pondering will a repeat
happen?
Reply: Great questions posed there
regarding the price chart. I think your guess is as good as mine whether a
repeat of price below S$3.50 or even S$2.50 will happen. Personally, I feel
there’s always a chance something like that will happen again though.
However, looking at this situation on a value standpoint may be a source of vindication. The ~S$3.40 price occurred in 2011Q4. In terms of available information then and for simplicity, we can use 2010’s financial data for reference. With earnings of S$793M (you may want to refer to the table in my post), the PER turns out to be about 7.7x which is also very attractive. Perhaps that is why over such a short period of time 3-6 months, the stock price recovered.
However, looking at this situation on a value standpoint may be a source of vindication. The ~S$3.40 price occurred in 2011Q4. In terms of available information then and for simplicity, we can use 2010’s financial data for reference. With earnings of S$793M (you may want to refer to the table in my post), the PER turns out to be about 7.7x which is also very attractive. Perhaps that is why over such a short period of time 3-6 months, the stock price recovered.
Alternatively, if you follow
my post and using the same technique, (Here, I assume that my view of the
fundamentals/stability for both Marine & Utilities is the same at that
point in time as it is now (this is quite likely) & I also used latest
results for Utilities but 7-years average for Marine instead of 10 years), the
valuation becomes S$6650M or about $3.70/share. I ignored the other segments in
both cases. It turns out that this is decidedly less attractive at that point
of time compared to now on a price to value basis (Value VS Price – 2011 is
S$3.70 VS S$3.40 & 2014 is S$5.15 VS S$4.15). Thus we can say that even
though the price is lower at ~$3.40 in 2011, it is not necessarily more
attractive when it is priced at S$4.15 in 2014. Of course there may be bias
(hindsight) etc but I’ve tried to minimize them using the same method when
looking at the company for both periods.
I guess the point here is that due to business developments over the years, we have better clarity in forming a rough intrinsic value estimate of the business itself which in 2014, we estimate it to be close to S$5.15 wherein we ‘wrongly’ estimate it to be at S$3.70 based on the available data in 2011. Without any doubts, we may yet again be proved wrong as the future unfolds. That's why we can't depend only on this counter in our entire portfolio.
I guess the point here is that due to business developments over the years, we have better clarity in forming a rough intrinsic value estimate of the business itself which in 2014, we estimate it to be close to S$5.15 wherein we ‘wrongly’ estimate it to be at S$3.70 based on the available data in 2011. Without any doubts, we may yet again be proved wrong as the future unfolds. That's why we can't depend only on this counter in our entire portfolio.
Not satisfied with the dividend yield.
Reply: The dividend yield for
Sembcorp Industries is not the best among many of the blue chip stocks around.
However, I suggest that dividend yield is part of the overall analysis.
If after analysis, we like a stock like Sembcorp but we feel the yield is too low, I think there's 2 ways to handle this:
1. If you feel that dividends will remain constant, wait for the price to drop further to get a higher dividend yield; or
2. Ensure the current price is low enough such that there's good upside for capital appreciation. Buy at this low enough price and hope that based on the fundamentals & potential growth of the company, the earnings will increase in the long-term and maybe future dividends will increase as a result.
For me, since the current dividend yield is already good enough for me and the company has been paying dividends yearly for >10 years now, I opt for the latter point 2 which is obviously the less wiser way.
If after analysis, we like a stock like Sembcorp but we feel the yield is too low, I think there's 2 ways to handle this:
1. If you feel that dividends will remain constant, wait for the price to drop further to get a higher dividend yield; or
2. Ensure the current price is low enough such that there's good upside for capital appreciation. Buy at this low enough price and hope that based on the fundamentals & potential growth of the company, the earnings will increase in the long-term and maybe future dividends will increase as a result.
For me, since the current dividend yield is already good enough for me and the company has been paying dividends yearly for >10 years now, I opt for the latter point 2 which is obviously the less wiser way.
Avi-Tech Electronics - Is Quick Profit Possible?
Seems this company has trouble finding ways to
make money? It's longer term prospect doesn't sound exciting. Be careful of
considering liquidation value based on its current cash. Check how much it
burns as well. Can disappear quickly due to operating expenses if it isn't
generating profitable sales. That margin of safety may not exist.
Reply: Thanks so much for visiting my
blog. I think you’ve raised a valid point here. The longer term prospect
doesn’t sound exciting at all. However, I believe the beaten-down price coupled
with the various corporate actions that act as some sort of catalyst have made
the stock a potentially attractive investment.
With regards to liquidation value, I’ve used it as one of the indicators of the company’s value. Like I mentioned in this post, between 2011-2013, the bulk of negative earnings are attributed to the subsidiaries (they contributed –S$12.8M while core ops contributed +S$1.7M). These loss-making subsidiaries are the exact same ones that management will discontinue and this will help stem much of the losses. Core operations endured comparatively minor losses which was worst at -S$1.61M in 2013 (VS subsidiaries –S$7.6M in 2012). 1Q2015 shows core business operating profitably signalling a potential turnaround.
With these, I believe the company is unlikely to burn as much cash as the past 3-4 years and correspondingly, the liquidation value can be used as a reasonable guide to its valuation at this point in time. Of course, the future is unpredictable and management can still burn cash in the future, especially through similar unsuccessful acquisitions. What I can say is that I did not place any positive prospects of the future in my valuation while the negative prospects are still guarded by some indication of margin of safety.
All in all, if I can find a few companies in this investment situation and at this price level for my even-type portfolio, I think the probability of profiting should be high overall. If you read my previous post on My SG Portfolio 2014 and Some recent picks,you will notice some companies in my event-type situations aren’t doing very well operationally and doesn’t seem to have bright prospects (one of them is facing a lawsuit too). I guess the point here for me is that because of these past losses, the price of Avi-Tech had been beaten down by investors/speculators to a point so low that they have essentially assumed these losses are very likely to continue far into the future.
With regards to liquidation value, I’ve used it as one of the indicators of the company’s value. Like I mentioned in this post, between 2011-2013, the bulk of negative earnings are attributed to the subsidiaries (they contributed –S$12.8M while core ops contributed +S$1.7M). These loss-making subsidiaries are the exact same ones that management will discontinue and this will help stem much of the losses. Core operations endured comparatively minor losses which was worst at -S$1.61M in 2013 (VS subsidiaries –S$7.6M in 2012). 1Q2015 shows core business operating profitably signalling a potential turnaround.
With these, I believe the company is unlikely to burn as much cash as the past 3-4 years and correspondingly, the liquidation value can be used as a reasonable guide to its valuation at this point in time. Of course, the future is unpredictable and management can still burn cash in the future, especially through similar unsuccessful acquisitions. What I can say is that I did not place any positive prospects of the future in my valuation while the negative prospects are still guarded by some indication of margin of safety.
All in all, if I can find a few companies in this investment situation and at this price level for my even-type portfolio, I think the probability of profiting should be high overall. If you read my previous post on My SG Portfolio 2014 and Some recent picks,you will notice some companies in my event-type situations aren’t doing very well operationally and doesn’t seem to have bright prospects (one of them is facing a lawsuit too). I guess the point here for me is that because of these past losses, the price of Avi-Tech had been beaten down by investors/speculators to a point so low that they have essentially assumed these losses are very likely to continue far into the future.
How to Get Rich - The Beauty of Compounding to Investors & Companies
Have you tried using
simulation which is the most important factor out of the three? Time, starting
capital or return factor?
I think you’ve posed a
very valid case here about finding out which is the most important factor.
Honestly, I'm not very good at such simulations. But if you've noticed, I've
used a factor of 1.5 for rate of return, r and starting capital, P in the case study
(i.e $100K x 1.5 = $150K, 10% x 1.5 = 15%). For time period, t, if we use a
starting capital of $100K and 30 years (20years x 1.5), the final amount would
be about S$1.75M. From this single but likely inconclusive datapoint, it
appears that time period and rate of return are the most important factors to
consider.
Unfortunately the rate of return probably is one of the least predictable of the 3 factors since there's no way we can be sure we can achieve 10% or 15% return over the long haul. Because of this unpredictability, I thought it is not so useful to state which factor is the most important in the practical sense. However, very fortunately for us, the time period is quite within our control and easily ‘applied’ if and only if we are young enough to start. Then again, achieving a 2-3% return over the long haul is probably easier than say, compounding it for 50 years due to the limitations of being a human. A balanced effort in working on all factors should be the better way to handle the compound equation.
All the 3 factors are highly intertwined and complementary to one another. For example, compounding $100K at 15% for 18, 19 and 20 years will give $1.24M, $1.42M ($180K more from 18th year), $1.64M ($220K more from 19th year) respectively. A good compound rate is important but the effect will be more pronounced if the length of time is extended due to the exponential effect of the formula. Similar relation applies for the other factors.
In conclusion, due to the varying ease of application and unpredictable nature of some factors, it is quite hard to conclude decisively which factor will do most for us in our lifetime. Consequently, I believe the best way to reconcile this is to focus on all 3 factors based on my proposed method to tackle each factor in my post (under The Real Trick – Combining all 3 Inputs).
THE BEAUTY OF COMPOUNDING COMPANIES & ITS IMPLICATIONS
Good post again to show the different scenarios amongst the 4. It's interesting though that you actually used the book value as a measurement of growth. I thought book value growth is much harder to achieve than earnings growth as it covers a wider spectrum. It is like earnings is the subset of that.
Reply: I used book value
in this case because it's easier for me to explain the compounding effect.
Also, unlike earnings and cashflows, book value is less subject to fluctuations
with time and thus more predictable for use. Besides these, book value is
highly related to earnings - A consistently growing book value usually
indicates healthy earnings over the period since whatever is left in net income
after deducting dividends goes to the book. Lastly, we can also view book value
as a rough gauge to the company's intrinsic value if it is to be a liquidated.
This means that using book value is not wrong although it may not be the best
choice in the end.
Other Articles:
My SG Portfolio 2014 (Top Realized Gains & Losses) and Some Recent Picks
AP Oil - A Neglected but Cheap Stock in Singapore
Our Stocks Investment Philosophy
Other Articles:
My SG Portfolio 2014 (Top Realized Gains & Losses) and Some Recent Picks
AP Oil - A Neglected but Cheap Stock in Singapore
Our Stocks Investment Philosophy
Thursday, 22 January 2015
The Beauty of Compounding in Companies and Its Implications
In my previous post on The Beauty of Compounding to Investors, I've discussed briefly on the mechanics of the simple compound interest equation and concluded that the best way for an investor to optimize its use is to identify each factor (starting capital, compound rate, time period) in the equation separately and work on the weaknesses (especially those that is easily within our control) so that the integration of all 3 factors can hopefully produce an exceptional result. In this post, I'll talk more about this effect on companies and try to relate it to the individual investor.
Case Studies & Assumptions
Let's use some of case studies for Company X (if you are curious about the company's real identity, like me on Facebook or follow my posts via email by subscribing on the right panel - Let me know by commenting below or emailing me at secretinvestors@gmail.com when this is done). As usual, to make things simple, some assumptions have to be made for the model:- In the actual case, Company X managed to grow its book value by compounding it at >10% annually for the past 12 years. Here, we assume that this growth rate will continue for the next 5 years. Book value now is $0.25 per share.
- Assume book value is a reasonable estimate to intrinsic value of the company and the market price of its stock will converge to its intrinsic/book value at the end of 5 years.
- No other forces (inflation etc) are at play that will skew the final results.
4 scenarios will be used here (please note again that book value for all scenarios is $0.25 per share):
- Scenario A: Market Price: $0.20 (20% discount to book), Growth rate: 0%
- Scenario B: Market Price: $0.30 (20% premium to book), Growth rate: 10%
- Scenario C: Market Price: $0.25 (at book value), Growth rate: 10%
- Scenario D: Market Price: $0.20 (20% discount to book), Growth rate: 10%
Summary of Scenario Results
![]() |
| Scenario Capital Appreciation Results (Dividends not factored in) |
Comparing Scenarios A & B, we see that despite paying at 20% premium to book value (for B), the stock investor is still able to turn in better results compared to one who bought at 20% discount to book value (for A) - provided the growth rate is high enough. In this case, a quick calculation shows that a 4.5% growth rate in Scenario B is sufficient to get the same 25% results achieved in Scenario A.
Comparing Scenarios C & D, it is clear that although the purchase price of D is only 20% lower than C and both have the same growth rate, D turns it significantly higher results (much more than 20%). All in all, Scenario D gives the best results. For your info: Company X is currently priced below that of Scenario D now, indicating a better upside if we were to base it on this very simplistic model.
This is a very simplistic view of the compounding effect but it does show the powerful snowballing effect of the compound equation. The key limitations are obviously in the assumptions. In the first place, we can't know for sure whether the book value or 'intrinsic' value can grow at 10% for the next year, save to say for 5 straight years. Also, there are definitely many other factors or uncertainties at play that will affect the final result. Lastly, for most companies, the book value does not equate to the intrinsic value. Even if they do, the market price may or may not converge to this implied intrinsic value at the end of 5 years (it could be earlier or later). Despite these limitations, I believe its good enough to show the compounding effect and its implications to the stock investor.
The Ultimate Approach - Dual Margin of Safety
Margin of safety is an important part of our overall investment framework as discussed in the post on Our Stocks Investment Philosophy. The above exhibit suggests 2 key ways to profit from the stock market. First and foremost, the investor can purchase securities at a price that is currently at a discount to a readily ascertainable intrinsic value as in Scenario A. This discount is in itself a margin of safety. Alternatively, the investor can purchase the security at a reasonably fair price as compared to the current intrinsic value but he or she must be confident that the future prospects or growth is so good that it is sufficient margin of safety for a profit to be made, as in Scenario C above.
The best approach to stock selection is of course to find securities that meets both criteria or approaches discussed in the previous paragraph - by having a discount to current value and potential growth that can further increase this value in the foreseeable future such that the cushion in price-value gap widens further over time. This is similar to Scenario D in the above table which as shown, give the best results out of the 4.
I will discuss further about the obstacles in execution in the application of the Dual Margin of Safety approach and end off with my proposed solution. Let me know if there's alternative methods or approaches that you've been doing that has been consistently successful ya?
Disclosure:
Long Company X - Do you know which company is this?
As mentioned, if you are curious about Company X's real identity, like me on Facebook or follow my posts via email by subscribing on the right panel - When this is done, let me know by commenting below or emailing me at secretinvestors@gmail.com :-)
Friday, 16 January 2015
How to Get Rich - The Beauty of Compounding to Investors and Companies
"Compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world. He who understands it, earns it ... he who doesn't ... pays it." - Albert Einstein.
I’m always
amazed by the mechanics and impact of the compounding effect. The basic compound
interest formula is:-
Where:
Where:
F = Future value or final value of the
investment
P = Principal or the starting capital
r = Annual rate of return
t = The number of years this return is compounded
P = Principal or the starting capital
r = Annual rate of return
t = The number of years this return is compounded
To let the compounding effect work its
wonder, an investor needs to focus on the Starting Capital (denoted by P),
Annual rate of return (r) and the number of years (t). Let’s use $100,000
starting capital, 10% annual return and 20 years as baseline inputs for
comparisons with other permutations. For simplicity, effects of inflation are
neglected throughout.
As observed from the table and chart, for all cases the
value of gains is much more than the initial capital itself. But what can we really
learn from these results and what can we do to maximize the compounding effect?
![]() |
| Effects of Compounding with Various Inputs |
I find it quite worthwhile to classify these inputs based on
the level of control we have over them. By identifying them singularly, we can
find out which inputs we are lacking and categorically work on them.
Time Factor (t)
As observed above, time is an absolute critical factor for
the effects of compounding to snowball the initial capital as much as possible.
All of the input invested 7 years late did worse than the baseline input. If we
have $100K and can compound 10% for 20 years but we do it 7 years later, our
gains is a 57% or $327K lesser! 7 years later is 7 years too late. This is
something that we can control only when
we are still young. The key is to start investing as early as possible and have the patience to let the compounding effect work.
To put it into practical perspective, if a 40 year old who
earns an average of $100K per year invest with baseline results, he will have
an extra $245K by 53 years old. This would mean that his investments gave him
an extra 2.45 years of working income. However, if he started 7 years earlier
at 33 years old, he will have an extra $570K by 53 years old which also means
that he gets an extra 5.7 years of his working income. Why work another 5.7 years
when you can actually get the same amount of money with less effort? Retiring a
few years earlier is certainly not bad at all!
Starting Capital (P)
The Starting Capital is also important but comparatively less
controllable. Different individual profiles will have differing amounts of starting capital to
invest. Most of the time, we can’t really control how much we have at the start (especially when we are young). However, all of
us have universal control in terms of the proportion
of our money we set aside to save and invest. This is a definitely a decision that
can be made and acted upon for almost everyone.
Return Factor (r)
Can we really achieve 10% returns per annum for our
investments? No one knows. Sometimes its luck and other times it may be because of innate talent. I believe the best way to potentially improve anyone’s returns is
through continually seeking and acquiring investment & financial knowledge.
This is definitely something within our control. There are many books, articles
and videos online and offline that teach us how to make our money work harder
for us. Of course, this takes time and effort but I think it’s the only way to handle
this factor properly.
The Real Trick – Combining All 3 Inputs
What’s the use if we can earn an impressive return from our
investments but we can compound it for only 2 years? There’s also little use
when we have 30 years to compound our money when we can only achieve a 2%
return. The real trick lies in combining all 3 inputs in the compound interest
equation. To do this, we first need to tackle each factor separately by (a) Identifying
which factor we are lacking the most, (b) Find out what we can do that is within our control to improve the factor, (c) Work on improving them and (d) Repeat the process again starting from part (a).
Let me know if you have other ways to optimize the compounding magic :-)
Note: Just want to highlight that there’s
another factor that is not included in this simple compound interest equation.
That is the additional cashflows you can add into your investment sum every
period. Imagine you can compound 10% in 20 years with a starting capital of
$100K and on top of that, you are also able to contribute another $12K into your
portfolio annually - Your final value would be $1.36M with a contribution of
$340K in total. This is compared to the baseline case mentioned above with
$672K final value and $100K contribution.
This post
is longer than expected. I’ll talk more about the companies which can continually compound their value through time from an investor's viewpoint.
Thursday, 8 January 2015
Avi-Tech Electronics (CT1.SI) – Is Quick Profit Possible?
In my post
on My SG Portfolio 2014 and Some Recent Picks, I’ve mentioned that one of my
event-driven picks for 2015 is Avi-Tech Electronics. I think price then was about
S$0.074 and I’ve accumulated since November at an average price including costs
of S$0.699. There are some interesting comments in the post (you should read it here) and I thought that
probably it’s good to write a short article about my analysis.
Avi-Tech
Electronics is listed on the SGX and is a provider for Burn-in, engineering
and manufacturing services in the semi-conductor & electronics industry. In
2011, It ventured into the Imaging Equipment and Energy Efficient Products by
starting 2 subsidiaries to ‘diversify and substantiate long-term growth’ for
the company. Guess what happened in the end: since 2011, the company began incurring losses largely
due to these same subsidiaries and management has finally decided to discontinue these operations just a couple of months back. Originally, the classification of this type of
purchase in my portfolio (see post for more details about this) do not require intensive
analysis – so I’ll try to keep things simple here. The following data are based
on my 30 Dec 2014 post:
Price =
S$0.074
Shares outstanding = 342,422,096
Market Cap = S$25.34M
P/E = NA (losses)
EV/EBIT = NA (losses)
Shares outstanding = 342,422,096
Market Cap = S$25.34M
P/E = NA (losses)
EV/EBIT = NA (losses)
P/NTA = 0.63
Investment Thesis
The results
in this classification of stocks depend a lot on corporate events which in some sense
serve as a catalyst to close up the price-value gap, hopefully in a fairly short period of time. My investment decision is
premised on the following:
- The management has destroyed huge value over the years from the 2 loss-making subsidiaries. Many shareholders could have loss confidence with management's ability and decided to sell / cut losses.
- The poorer fundamentals and financial results combined with the inclusion onto the SGX watch-list due to 3 consecutive years of pre-tax losses has led to a stock price decline that is likely over-exaggerated.
- This exaggeration led to a fair degree of undervaluation which also means a potential investment opportunity to the shrewd analyst.
- Directors have been mopping up shares recently with their own money and to that extent, agreeing with my view that the stock price might be undervalued.
- The disposal of subsidiaries which are main contributors of past years' losses may improve future earnings at least in the short term and this may prop up the market price.
Key Risks / Uncertainty
Management indicated that they will “continue with its plans to seek new areas of
growth whether through mergers and acquisitions, or any structured transaction
or business, which will add value to shareholders.” Has management really
learnt their lesson from previous experiences? Are they capable enough to
continue ‘adding value’ through acquisitions? Personally, I feel its foolish for them to do that considering their
core business ain’t doing as well as before too (more details below).
Also,
we can’t deny the fact that they are in a difficult semi-conductor
industry which presents a challenge to the management (that is
perhaps why they insist on growing through acquisitions etc) and a risk that the investor need to be wary of.
Safeguards and Checks – In case things do not turn out well
Like I say, the need for intensive analysis is not really required for the event-type part of my portfolio and I hope to realize some profits in a reasonably short period of time. However, as a safeguard, I better ensure there’s some sort of margin of safety if things don’t work out and I might have to hold on to it for a longer than expected timeframe. Since this will be a minor position in my portfolio, a brief analysis should be sufficient.
Financial Position
The balance
sheet is generally cash rich with net cash equivalents of about S$23.5M which compares
favorably to the market cap at S$25.3M. Book value is about S$40M. If the
company is liquidated now, I believe we can get back more than what we pay now.
Of course, if management continues eroding value by doing foolish expansions,
the intrinsic value on a liquidating basis may drop below our price paid in
light of such later developments in the business.
I’ve cleaned up the effects
of the loss-making subsidiaries in the above table and it is clear that these
subsidiaries have indeed eroded earnings between 2011 and 2013, before management
decide to discontinue operations in 2014. The core operations haven’t been doing well too considering that they also have registered
some losses between 2012 to 2014. Core business revenue has declined
drastically from S$70M to S$23M over 7 years.
However, keep in mind that the
bulk of the negative earnings is attributed to the subsidiaries (contribution
by subsidiaries is -S$12.8M compared to +S$1.7M for core business from 2011 to
2013).
Valuation
Not surprisingly, thanks to these loss-making subsidiaries, share price has declined more than 60% since 2011. The discontinuation of the subsidiaries has stemmed losses greatly and results in 1Q2015 shows a positive profit. Could there be turnaround which can lift share price higher? No one can say this for sure.
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| Avi-Tech Electronics 5 Year Stock Chart |
Let's use 2010 and 2015 results for comparison since in both years, the loss-making
subsidiaries are non-existent. A back-of-the envelope calculation shows PER of
2010 is about 15.6X while forward PER of 2015 appears to be about 9.1X (I
annualized 1Q15 earnings per share of S$0.002 here as an approximation). Assuming all else
remains the same, this could be another indication that share price decline has
been exaggerated and the market probably has not factored in the positive effects
from the disposal. If valuation in 2010 is any guide, the market price should
be priced around S$0.12! Of course, I’m not saying these assumptions are
reasonable but at least it gives me some level of comfort here knowing that I'm not buying at a ridiculously high price.
Because the earnings has been quite unstable, probably the balance sheet can give better insights
about its intrinsic value. Taking a haircut of 50% to PPE (NB: this part of the
balance sheet is throwing in some S$500K-S$700K rental income annually), 25% to
inventory and 10% to receivables, we get a liquidation value of S$0.094 per
share as compared to the price of S$0.074. (Potential Bonus 1: I did not include the proceeds that the
company may receive from the disposal of subsidiary in this valuation).
Conclusion
A
high price can turn stocks of good quality businesses into a speculative
purchase and likewise, a low price can turn a speculative stock into an
attractive investment. My opinion is that Avi-Tech belongs to the latter.
Considering the pros and cons, I think the low price coupled with the existence
of potential catalysts make the purchase of Avi-tech too attractive to be
denied by the security analyst. However, the risks mentioned above also means
that the sizing of the position in the portfolio should be kept relatively
small - just in case management screw things up again. (Potential Bonus 2: we
already ensured there's some margin of safety to absorb unfavourable future
developments but what if by some freak nature, the future acquisitions are so
successful that future earnings improve dramatically? This is definitely not accounted
for yet).
Some Final Thoughts
Due
to it’s classification in my portfolio & unless there’s any clear-cut
change in circumstances, my guess is that I will take most of my profits (if
any) within the next 12 months. I mentioned that my average price purchased
including costs since November ‘14 is S$0.0699. Price now at S$0.078 would mean that my
current returns is about 12% in slightly less than 2 months. Obviously this is
not the best business in the best industry and I have the urge to take my
profits initially when it was at S$0.08. After some deliberation, I figured that my estimate of
S$0.094 is really a minimum valuation which is so conservative to the extent
that it is a reasonably dependable guide. Moreover, one of the directors bought back shares a couple of days back at about S$0.078. Maybe somewhere around S$0.09 I can consider trimming
my stakes. I would be more than happy to get some opinions about this.
PS:
I’m surprised that I took about an hour of analysis before my decision to
purchase Avi-Tech but it took me more than 3-4 hours to write it in this blog!
Disclosure:
Long Avi-Tech Electronics (CT1.SI)
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